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This paper aims at modelize a multiple matching model, in which the decision of activity on the labour
market is endogenous. Most of works on the labour market concern the only demand-side. These works
do not consider the supply-side as endogenous. Thus, no policy can be explorated to improve the labour
market situation.
The supply policies seem to be the new way of action of the diﬀerent governments among the European
Union. In particular, in France, a policy which increases the level of earned incomes on the low wages
is led since 2002, as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the United States. This principle, called
"Prime Pour l’Emploi" (PPE), is supposed to incite unskilled unemployed to take a job.
In this paper, I explain that, with an endogenous activity choice, such policies may have ambiguous
eﬀects on unemployment and social accounts. Indeed, new unemployed workers are attracted on the
eﬀective labour market by these job-taking incentives. The unemployement duration increase and the
consequences on the social accounts are not obvious. Furthermore, inactivity traps phenomena can
appear.
I modelize the eﬀects of an alternative policy: tax cuts on low wage associated with minimum wage
increase. I show that it improves employment and production at a lower cost for the government.Introduction.
It appears today that the size of the active population matters, because of the debate over the
sustainability of many welfare state programs. The recent demographic trends seem to show that only
economies with high employment and participation rates can maintain high *levels of social security. But
most economic analysis considers only the labor demand, or uses some very simple and mechanic eﬀects
(neoclassical labor supply function in particular). Event in the Handbook of Labor Economics devoted
to labor supply, the mechanism are very simple and not very interesting.
Then, if diﬀerent and varied tools are now available about the demand side policies and the consecutive
dynamic adjustments, it’s not the same concerning the supply side. Indeed, most of the possible policies
on the demand side of the labor market seems to be considered in these models, eventually via some
adaptations and improvements. Now, concerning the supply side, more developments and considering
are possible ; and this all the more seriously that these questions seem to be one of the big challenges for
the politics and people working on the labor market.
Indeed, the inactivities traps, incentive to take back a job, etc seem to be among the important
questions on policies, but there also among the less clearly modelized in the labor market economics.
Furthermore, in these times of retirement system ﬁnancing, it’s evidently important to know how incite
people to go to job activity, and to take a job.
It’ obvious that participation decisions in real labor markets are not fully understood. Furthermore,
what do we kown about the interactions between participation decisions and job creations? Very few rig-
orous works been led concerning a global equilibrium with endogenous participation and unemployment.
Developping in particular the works of [Pietro Garibaldi, 2003] this work attempts to build a multi-
state model of the labor market, in which the decisions of job destructions/creations, entry/exit in the
labor market, employment/unemployment.
This theoritical consideration is based on the fact that people spend simultaneously a their time al-
lowance in both market and home production. With a choice between leisure, home production and mar-
ket work, the business cycle literature has improved the calibration of various aspects of the data, such as
output volatility, the correlation between hours and productivity and the correlation between investments
in home and market capital ([Rios-Rull, 1993], [Paul Gomme, 2001]). But the existing business cycle lit-
erature studies home production within frictionless labor markets. I try, as [Pietro Garibaldi, 2003] to
study the border between market and home production in an imperfect labor market. It’s supposed that
heterogenous workers face idiosyncratic shocks to domestic production ability, but market frictions im-
pose a cost to labor market participation. Since we work with a technologically ﬁxed number of hours, our
analysis abstracts from the intensive margin of labor supply, and concentrates to the extensive margin.
In the paper, we explore in details the e.ects of time consuming search, a market friction into employment
that has attracted a great deal of attention in the macro literature ([Hall, ] and [Dale T. Mortensen, ]).
The model here considered shows that the decisions to participate or not participate are diﬀerent,
then it will be more margins than worker categories, because of the existence of an entry cost on the
labor market. The several labor supply margins readily rationalize a labor market with employment,
unemployment and full time home production.
Furthermore, much of the developped matching models, except maybe [Campens et al., 2002], [Campens, 2003],
[Arnaud Chéron, 2003], don’t use microeconomic fundations to explain diﬀerences between skills. Now
wage distribution does not necesserarily explain skill diﬀerences, and it’s important to know the reasons
of transitions between skills. In particular, we have shown a real increase in the number of worker paid on
the minimum wage in the last years, and it’s important to have some elements to explain such transitions.
This work attemps to develop endogenous market participation in multiple a matching model, with
endogenous human capital acquisition, real and nominal rigidities (minimum wage, frictions, wage bar-
gaining, unemployment beneﬁts, minimum income, etc.). Earlier, Burdett, have already examinated
the relations between search frictions and labor supply, but with a ﬁxed supply of jobs. The theo-
retical distinction between inactivity and unemployment, is inspired by [Burdett and Mortensen, 1998].
[Pissarides, 2000], have introduced a labor demand side and endogenous participation, and bring few new
elements compared to the standard model of matching.
This model, building on both macroeconomic factors, individual (household) shocks, and microeco-
nomic fundations about skills can show structural ﬂows between activity and inactivity, and level of skill,
even when macro-conditions are unchanged.
11M e t h o d o l o g y .
This model proposes to represent an endogenous labor supply comportment, in a multiple matching
model. Most of the supply-side labor market models today developped show often some mecanic eﬀects,
economically little interessant. In this paper, I try to show that can exist asymetric comportments of
entry/quit on the labor market.
What is done here continues the works of [Campens, 2003] which are a dynamic consideration of a
multiple matching model and [Pietro Garibaldi, 2003] who show an endogenous supply model.
The main model elements are :
-an entry/exit comportment on the job market based on microeconomic fundations
-an asymmetry of these comportments
-the representation of real rigidities on the job market (minimum wage, minimum income, unem-
ployment beneﬁts, wage negociations, mobility costs, etc.)
-heterogeneous workforce
2 The model.
Taking the model of [Campens et al., 2002], it’s assumed that the labor market can be segmented as
following :
-a unskilled workforce, with no human capital, payed on the minimum wage
-a speciﬁc skilled workforce, with speciﬁc human capital bringed by the employer, and negociating
his wage
-a general skilled workforce, with general human capital, acquired outside the labor market, and
negociating his wage.
Both ﬁrst types of workforce, move one to the other via a speciﬁc formation process, which is controled
by the employers of the speciﬁc-skilled workforce. This process permits to the unskilled workers to acquire
as p e c i ﬁc human capital and to access a better job. The third part of the workforce concerns the most
skilled part of the workforce, it’s assumed to be "seal" ; access to this formation doesn’t directly exist in
the job market1.
Whole labor market is based on matching process àl aPissarides [Pissarides, 2000].
2.1 Time repartition, domestic production.
In this model, it’s assumed that the agents have one unit of time, that they can share out among three
activities :
-productive work, spending time he.
-the (eventual) job seek, spending time hs
-the domestic production, spending time 1 − he − hs
It’s assumed for the moment, that the working time is an exogenous ﬁxed variable, and takes the
value e in the case of an employed worker, and 0 else.
he = {0,e}
It’s also assumed that the job search time is exogenously ﬁxed, and will be noted s if the agent actually
searches for a job, and 0 else.
hs = {0,s}
During the domestic production time, each agent produce a amount x of domestic good. This ability
to produce domestic good is assumed to diﬀer among agents, and can vary along time with instantaneous
probability λ. With such a shock, this ability can take any value in the existence interval of x. However,
this interval is supposed to be ﬁnished and borned : x ∈
£
xmin,x max¤
1Of course, the access to general human capital exists, but is outside the job market. Thus it’s not represented here.
22.2 The ﬂows on the labor market.
The present labor market is based on matching process àl aPissarides, and supposes the existence of
ﬂows inside the labor market. We will see that matching exists on diﬀerent levels.
Concerning the unskilled agents, several changes are possible in their life. At each time, such an
agent can be an employed worker (then he will earn a legal minimum wage), a job seeker (unemployed,
he will then have unemployment beneﬁts). On these jobs, it exists matching between vacant jobs and
unemployed, as in the simplest matching case.
However, when these agents are in this type of jobs, they have the opportunity to acquire speciﬁc
human capital. This opportunity transits by a new matching process between "speciﬁc-skilled" vacant
jobs and unskilled employed workers. A second ﬂoor of matching is then build.
Concerning the general skilled workers, the matching process is the same than in the simplest case.
Note that these ﬂows are not the only ones on our labor market ; the global workforce is not supposed
ﬁxed as often done. Actually, via shocks on domestic abilities, the agents will choose to enter or exit
on the labor market. In this case, the global workforce have a variable size, and these ﬂuctuations will
directly inﬂuence the matching process.
Several categories of agents will potentially coexist in the labor market :
-unskilled non-working agents
-unskilled job seeker agents
-unskilled employed workers
-speciﬁc skilled employed workers
-general skilled non-working agents
-general skilled job seeker agents
-general skilled employed workers2
The matching functions will take the classic form of C o o b - D o u g l a sf u n c t i o n s .T h i sh y p o t h e s i si sd o n e
in all (or almost) the works using matching process.3











In this case, the matching has the particularity to be done between vacant jobs and already ﬁlled jobs.
If the process is not modiﬁed in appearance, except the fact that there is a direct interaction between
ﬂows of these two categories of employees, we will show later that this particulartiy involves changes from
classic matching models4.






where γi is the elasticity of the vacant jobs on the matching function concerning the jobs of type i.
If θi is the tightness existing on the segment i of the labor market (represented by the ratio
V i
Si
,w h e r e
Si is the number of agents searching a job of type i), it can be deduced that the probability to ﬁll an










2It’s supposed, in order to simplify the model that general skilled agents make ever the choice to be active on the labor
market.
3See the works of Pissarides (1986), Petrongolo (1999) or Blanchard & Diamond (1989).
4develop overshooting phenomena





































is the probability for an unskilled worker to access a speciﬁcs k i l l e dj o b .
As preceding,
mq (θq)
will be the probability to ﬁll a general skilled vacant job and
θqmq (θq)
will be the probability to quit unemployment to employement for a general skilled agent.
A the steady state, the ﬂows can be represented by the following equations : :
u[θnmn (θn)+n + λ(1 − F (xe))] = n + F (xe)[hλ + sele + snln] (4a)
ln [sn + θeme (θe)+λ(1 − F (xqn)) + n]=uθnmn (θn) (4b)
le [se + λ(1 − F (xqe)) + n]=lnθeme (θe) (4c)
h[λF (xe)+n]=uλ(1 − F (xe)) + ln [sn (1 − F (xe)) + λ(1 − F (xqn))]
+le [se (1 − F (xe)) + λ(1 − F (xqe))] (4d)
where li (i = n,e), u, h and n are resepectively the proportion of each type of job, the unskill unem-
ployment rate, the non-working proportion in the total population, and the growth rate of the population.
2.3 The value functions of the agents.
2.3.1 The case of agents without general human capital.
The case of a non-working agent. In the case of a non-working agent, it’s assumed that he earns at
each instant a legal minimum income noted ϑ, and that the level of his domestic production is x (since
he spends his whole time to this "activity"). Concerning the diﬀerent possibilities of the status evolution
of this agent, the only one is the decision to go to unemployment ; this decision depends of the diﬀerent
variables (minimum income5, minimum wage, etc.) but also on the evolution of his domestic ability (then
of the variable x). This event is represented by the variable λ which is the instantaneous probability of
shock on the variable x by any event6.







(x + ϑ)dt + λdt
Z xe
xmin
V un (e x)dF (e x)+λdt
Z xmax
xe
V hn (e x)dF (e x)+( 1− λdt)V hn (x)
#
(5)
where xen is the entrance threshold on the labor market concerning an unskilled non-working agent,
and V un is the value function of an unemployed unskilled worker.
.
Written in utility ﬂow, this value function becomes :








V hn (e x)dF (e x) (6)
The case of an unskilled employed worker. The case of an unskilled employed worker is not very
diﬀerent than the case of known models, except the fact that the variable x can be modiﬁed by any choc.
In such a case, the worker has to make a choice between the decision of staying in his job or leaving the
labor market and becoming a non-working unskilled agent. The instantaneous gain of this agent comes
from the spent time to domestic production (1 − e), and from his net wage, noted τnwn.
An other shock which could occur is an exogenous destruction of the job, which instantaneous prob-
ability sn ; in this case the agent has to make a choice between searching for a new job (becoming
unemployed) or becoming a non-working. Finally, the agent, can access to a speciﬁc human capital
formation with a probability θeme (θe) and then to a better job (with a expected value V e1 (x))





(1 − e)xdt + τnwndt + λdt
Z xqn
xmin
V n (e x)dF (e x)+λdt
Z xmax
xqn
V hn (e x)dF (e x) (7)
+θeme (θe)dtV e1 (x)+sndtmax
©
V un (x),Vhn (x)
ª
+(1− λdt − θeme (θe)dt − sndt)V n (x)] (8)
When the domestic production ability is modiﬁed, the agent can be in three diﬀerent situations, by a
double choice :
-the job is not destroyed and the agent make a direct choice between non-working and his current
job
-the job is destroyed by the employer and then the employee makes a choice between unemploye-
ment and non-working.
This consideration takes importance when it’s considered the employer comportment in front of a
domestic ability shock (this concept is developped later)
Written in ﬂows, the value function becomes :
(r + λ)V n (x)=( 1 − en)x + τnwn + λ
Z xqn
xmin
V n (e x)dF (e x)+λ
Z xmax
xqn





V un (x),Vhn (x)
ª





V e1 (x) − V n (x)
¢
(10)
5The case of a speciﬁc skilled worker in his new job. As p e c i ﬁc skilled worker acessing a new job
earns a net wage τewe1, which is negotiated by a Nash bargaining, and receives a direct utility from the
spent time to domestic production (or leisure) 1−ee. Such an agent has not more possibilities to upgrade
his social status (except a extern phenomenon which is not represented here). However, his situation can
be modiﬁed by two channels :
-exogenous destruction of the job (with instantaneous probability se) ; then he may make a choice
between inactivity and unemployment
-domestic ability shock (with instataneous probability λ) ; then he may make a choice between
his current job, unemployment, or inactivity.





(1 − ee)xdt + τewe1 (x)dt + λdt
Z xqe1
xmin
V e2 (e x)dF (e x)+λdt
Z xmax
xqe1
V hn (e x)dF (e x)
+sedtmax
©
V un (x),Vhn (x)
ª
+(1− λdt − sedt)V e1 (x)
¤
(11)
In fact, it appears that the eventuality of volontary unemployment is not represented. Actually, it’s
easy to show that the threshold of eﬀective labor market exit is upper than the entry threshold ; that is
that if the agent decide to going out of the eﬀective labor market, it’s because his domestic production
ability is suﬃciently high to permit himself a higher utility from non-working than unemployment and
job search.7.
The utility ﬂows can be written :
(r + λ)V e1 (x)=( 1 − ee)x + τewe1 (x)+λ
Z xqe1
xmin
V e2 (e x)dF (e x)+λ
Z xmax
xqe1





V un (x),Vhn (x)
ª
− V e1 (x)
¤
The case of an already speciﬁc-skilled employee. The utility of an already speciﬁc skilled employee
is little diﬀerent of the precedent case, the only diﬀerence is the level of wage, negotiated on other outside






(1 − ee)xdt + τewe2 (x)dt + λdt
Z xqe1
xmin
V e2 (e x)dF (e x)+λdt
Z xmax
xqe1
V hn (e x)dF (e x)
+sedtmax
©
V un (x),Vhn (x)
ª
+(1− λdt − sedt)V e2 (x)
¤
(12)
In ﬂo w st h i se q u a t i o n sb e c o m e s:
(r + λ)V e2 (x)=( 1 − ee)x + τewe2 (x)+λ
Z xqe2
xmin
V e2 (e x)dF (e x)+λ
Z xmax
xqe2





V un (x),Vhn (x)
ª




6The case of an unemployed. An unemployed has made the choice to be in activity but hasn’t yet
found a job.
He has each instant, an amount b of unemployment beneﬁts (eventually function of his precedent wage
and/or his precedent beneﬁts), and an utility ﬂow from his domestic production with time 1 − s.T h e n
this agent spend a time s to search a job and to make the necessary steps to.
At each instant, with a probability θnmn (θn), he has the opportunity to be proposed to a unskilled
job, and then to acceed to the utility V n. And in the case of change of his domestic production ability
(with a probability λ), he’ll have to make a choice between activity (unemployment) and inactivity.













V hn (e x)dF (e x)
+θnmn (θn)dtV n (x)+( 1− λdt − θnmn (θn)dt)V un (x)] (14)
Or, in ﬂows :
(r + λ)V un =( 1− s)x+b+λ
Z xe
xmin
V un (e x)dF (e x)+λ
Z xmax
xe
V hn (e x)dF (e x)+θnmn (θn)(V n (x) − V un (x))
(15)
2.3.2 The agents with general human capital.
In this case, the hypothesis are not applicated for the moment. It’s supposed a simple matching process.
No more rigidities than frictions and wage negotiations exist on this part of the labor market. The value
functions are then very simple.
The case of the employee. At each time, a general skilled worker earn a net negotiated wage τqwq.
With an instantaneous probability sq he can loss his job and become an unemployed.




[τqwqdt + sqdtV uq +( 1− sq)V q]
In ﬂows :
rV q = τqwq + sq (V uq − V q)
The case of the unemployed. The unemployed, as in a classic matching model, has an instanta-





[bq + θqmq (θq)dtV q +( 1− θqmq (θq)dt)V q] (16)
in ﬂows :
rV uq = bq + θqmq (θq)(V uq − V q) (17)
8The terms bq will be developped later.
72.4 Firms.
The ﬁrms are, like the individuals, directly concerned by the possible changes in domestic abilities. Indeed,
the negotiated wage is directly inﬂuenced by the domestic ability, and will play on the net productivity
of jobs, then on the rentability and duration of the job.
2.4.1 Individual posts.
The case of the unskilled post.
The ﬁlled post. In this case, the value function will be directly inﬂuenced by the immediate net
productivity pnyn −wn. Then, the job can be destroyed by an exogenous shock with probability sn,t h e
the job is vacant. The job can be destroyed also the mobility of the employee to a more interessant job,
with an instantaneous probability θem(θe). Finally, the job can be modiﬁed by a domestic ability shock,








Πn (e x)dF (e x)+λdt
Z xmax
xf,
Πvn(e x)dF (e x)
+(1− sndt − λdt − θem(θe)dt)Πn (x)] (18)
in utility ﬂows :
(r + λ)Πn (x)=pnyn −n wn + λ
Z xfn
x
Πn (e x)dF (e x)+λ
Z xmax
xf,
Πvn(e x)dF (e x)
+sn (Πvn − Πn)+θem(θe)(Πvn − Πn) (19)
The vacant job. This case is trivial, and can be written as in the simplest matching models, except
the fact than the value can be indirectly inﬂuenced by the ﬂuctuations of x.
Then a vacant job, has a instantaneous probability mn (θn) to be ﬁlled.




[−µndt + mn (θn)dtΠn (x)+( 1− mn (θn)dt)Πvn(x)] (20)
in ﬂows :
rΠvn = −µn + mn (θn)(Πn (x) − Πvn)
The case of the skilled job. As written upper, it will exist a value for a just created job, and a value
for an already ﬁlled job. The only diﬀerence between the two jobs, will be the wage level and the human
capital bringing cost.
Such a job cannot know a lot of changes, because it represent the top situation of people without
general human capital.
So the value function is simply the immediate gain from the net productivity, ye −we (x),a u g m e n t e d
by the discounted value of the job in the future. Then with an instantaneous probability se the job is
destroyed and becomes vacant ; it can be also destroyed by a shock on the variable x ;i nt h i sc a s et h e r e
is renegotiation and the employer can decide to not keep the employee-employer couple.










Πe2 (e x)dF (e x)+λdt
Z xmax
xfe1
Πve (e x)dF (e x)
+(1− λdt − sedt)Πe1 (x)
¤
(21)
where Cf is the speciﬁc human formation cost, paid by the employer.
In ﬂows, this equation is then :
(r + λ)Πe1 (x)=−Cf + peye − ηewe1 (x)+λ
Z xfe1
xmin
Πe2 (e x)dF (e x)+λ
Z xmax
xfe1
Πve(e x)dF (e x) (22)
+se
¡
Πve(x) − Πe1 (x)
¢















Πve (e x)dF (e x) (24)








Πe2 (e x)dF (e x)+λ
Z xmax
xfe1
Πve(e x)dF (e x)+se
¡
Πve(x) − Πe2 (x)
¢
The vacant job.
This case is too simple, it’s supposed an exogenous cost of vacancy noted µe, and the vacant job can









Πe1 (x) − Cf
¢








Πe1 (x) − Πve(x) − Cf
¢¤
(27)
2.4.2 The case of general skilled job.
This case is the same as in the simplest matching models : no shock on domestic production ability and
no decision de participate on the labor market.







dt + sqdtΠvq +( 1− sqdt)Πq¤
(28)
in ﬂows :
rΠq = pqyq − ηqwq + sq (Πvq − Πq) (29)





−µqdt + mq (θq)dtΠq +( 1− mq (θq))Πvq¤
(30)
where mq (θq) is the instataneous probability to ﬁll the job.
What is written, in ﬂows :
rΠvq = −µq + mq (θq)(Πq − Πvq) (31)
2.4.3 Job creations.
The job creations decisions are simple free entrance conditions. The ﬁrms open vacant jobs as long as
these ones are not costly.At the equilibrium, the proﬁts on this vacant jobs are zero. These creations are
indirectly inﬂuenced by shocks on domestic productions abilities.
The case of unskilled job. Concerning the unskilled jobs, the job creation equations is simply the









pnyn − ηnwn + λ
R xfn
x Πn (e x)dF (e x)





which determine the number of vacant unskilled jobs to open.





r + λ + se
"
−Cft + peye − ηewe1 (x)+λ
Z xfe1
x
Πe2 (e x)dF (e x)
#
(33)
which determine the number of vacant speciﬁc skilled jobs to open.







which determine the number of vacant general skilled jobs to open.
2.5 The decision strategies.
Agents will chose ot their situation by the way of their value functions.
Indeed, to incite a non-working agent to come (back) on the labor market, his intertemporal utility as
a worker must be upper than in non-working ; in other terms, his intertemporal utility as a unemployed
must be upper than his current utility.
So the following condition appears :
V un (xe) ≥ V hn
i (xe) (35)
⇐⇒
sxe + ϑ ≤ b + θnmn (θn)
£¡
V n − V hn¢
(xe)
¤
where xe is the entrance threshold on domestic ability. Is the ability is higher than this level, the
agent doesn’t come on the eﬀective labor market.
Symetrically, an active agent, decide to go out of the labor market when his intertemporal utility as
non-working agent becomes higher than his current utility.
Exists a double condition :
-concerning unskilled agents
V hn (xqn) ≥ V n (xqn) (36)
⇐⇒
exqn + ϑ ≥ τnwn + θeme (θe)
£¡







V n (e x)dF (e x)+
Z xmax
xqn
V hn (e x)dF (e x) −
Z xe
xmin
V un (e x)dF (e x) −
Z xmax
xe
V hn (e x)dF (e x)
#
-concerning general skilled agents
V hn (xqei) ≥ V ei (xqei) (37)
⇐⇒





V e2 (e x)dF (e x)+
Z xmax
xqei




V un (e x)dF (e x) −
Z xmax
xe
V hn (e x)dF (e x)
#
2.6 Wage bargaining.
2.6.1 The unskilled wage.
It’s supposed that this wage is exogenous and politically ﬁxed. This can be justiﬁed by the fact that
unskilled workers have not really bargaining power on the labor market, and by the fact that productive
ability is not revealed before the worker has a job.
wn = w (38)
112.6.2 The speciﬁc skilled wage.
Concerning this categories of workers, it’s said that two wages exist : an entry wage, and a durable wage.
Concerning the entry wage, the negotiation will be made on outside option which is the unskilled job.
So :
we1 =a r gm a x
n£
Πe1 (x) − Πve(x) − Cf
¤1−λe1 £
V e1 (x) − V n (x)
¤λe1o
Concerning the durable wage, the outside option is the unemployment, or inactivity, then :
we2 =a r gm a x
n£
Πe2 (x) − Πve(x)
¤1−λe2 £
V e2 (x) − max
¡
V un (x),Vhn (x)
¢¤λe2o
(39)




















V hn (e x)dF (e x)
!#
(40)
2.6.3 The general skilled wage.
The bargaining process is more simple than in previous cases, and is as in simple matching models, the
wage is like :
wq =a r gm a x
n
(Πq − Πvq)












+( 1− λq)bq (41)
2.7 The ﬁnal good market.
It will be assumed that exists a ﬁnal good market, working with perfect conccurence rules, and where
the intermediate goods demands are obtained by a maximisation program of the representative ﬁrm of




















where the price of the ﬁnal good is normalized to the unity, and where N∗
i is the real quantity of




















Nevertheless, since it’s assumed that each worker produces one unity of intermediate good, it’s equiv-
alent to consider the quantity of each intermediate good, or the quantity of each part of manpower.
9Mathematic annex
12Then the solutions of this program are given par the following equatities :




















































Consequently, at the equilibrium, the price ratios will depend of the number of jobs in each part of
the job market, determined by the matching process and the negotation processes early written.
In the approch here done, and in order to obtain a very general case, the production function used will
be a CES one, which permits to obtain all the cases possible in terms of complementarity/substitution
between the factor.




























This representation open large considerations. Then a global productivity factor A could play on
shocks on global productivity, and each factors have a productivity factor could simulate biased shocks
of productivity. .
The choice of using two agregates in the production technology :
-one grouping the two types of agents without general human capital
-one grouping the workers with general human capital and the physical capital
is justiﬁed by a more simple evaluation of the elasticities inside each aggregate, and by the fact that
other works consider generally an aggregate skill work-capital.








































B1 ≡ α(β1 (AnN∗
n)



































































































































































The price of capital (interest rate) is assumed ﬁxed. Then the interest rate will determine implicitly
the level of capital necessary to the ﬁrm.
143 An application to the french economy.
In order to give a more consistent signiﬁcation, this model will be applied to the french economy in
order to have a real tool to make policy simulations. Then the setting of this model aims at having an
equilibrium as near as possible from the situation of the french economy in 2000 (full employment year).
3.1 Calibration.
3.1.1 Workforce repartition.
The considered population is the workers of the private sector, approximatively 14,5milllions working
people. According the Enquête Emploi (EE)10 concerning the year 2000, the general skilled workers
represent about one third of the total working population, then about 5millions agents. Concerning the
non-general skilled workers, the ACEMO-SMIC survey seems to estimate the number of the minimum
wage workers at 2,3millions, since works on the EE 2000 estimate the workers paid under 1,1 time the
minimum wage at a little upper level.
3.1.2 Structural parameters.
Minimum wage levels and speciﬁc human capital acquisition costs, are set by the ﬁnal production value.
To have acceptable ratios, the cost of speciﬁc human capital acquisition is then assumed to be six times
the value of the premium minimum wage. Then, it’s ﬁxed here to be 6000C =.
The bargaining powers are justiﬁed by the works of [Abowd and Allain, 1996], who concluded a bar-
ganing power ﬁxed at 0,4 on french statistics.
Concerning the general-skilled employees, it’s assumed that the bargaining power is perfectly shared.
It can indeed assumed that, with their general skill, and the fact that they can be employed in every
ﬁrm, the bargaining power is the same that the other bargainer, wich is their employer.
The separation rates are set to have some conform annual separation rates. According to the DMMO
(Déclaration des Mouvements de Main d’Oeuvre) these annual separation rates are 20% and 15% con-
cerning respectivly the unskilled and the speciﬁc-skilled workers. [Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2002] use an
annual separation rate of 15%. I use here a monthly exogenous probability of .025 for the unskilled
workers, 0.0125 for the speciﬁc-skilled workers, and 0.02 for the general-skilled workers.
The potentially active population growth is supposed to be zero, this hypothesis doesn’t change
fundamentaly the results.
Concerning the matching function elasticities, they’re set to 0,5, as used in Cahuc & Zylberberg.
The contributions rates are set on the year 2000, including the cuts on the low wages since 1993.
Concerning the lower wages, the employer and employee contribution rates are respectivly 40% and
21% of the premium wage. With the contribution cuts, applied since 1993/1995, the level of employer
contribution rate falls to 21%. Concerning the speciﬁcly skilled workers, these levels are respectively, 38%
and 21%.
The parameters of the production function are set with the works of [Cahuc et al., ], [Guy Laroque, 2000].
Concerning the matching functions, a lot of empirical works have been led, with diﬀerent results. The
most simple and neutral case, is to use a parameter 0.5, what is done here for both matching functions.
The constant scale parameter of the matching functions are set to obtain some consistant transition rates
between unemployement/employment and unskilled/skilled job.
The vacancy costs are set by the works of [John Abowd, 2003].
10Oﬃcial statistic source concerning the french labor market
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The home productivity is uniformly distributed on [0;1]. This hypothesis could appear extremly simpli-
fying, but this paper interests to average wages, and average decisions. It’s not very important to have
a real wage distribution here. In future developments, this hypothesis will be changed, in order to have
wage distribution conforming the reality.
The monthly arrival rate of the indiosyncratic shock is set to 0.10 as in Garibaldi&Wasmer (2003).
3.2 Model equilibrium.
With these parameters, the stationary equilibrium model gives for the year 2000 :
Variable Rate % Value
(millions)
Unskilled employment 18.88 2,689
Speciﬁc-skill employment 49.42 7.038
Non activity 15,73 2,240
General-skill employment 96,32 4.816
Unskilled unemployment (non-participant excluded) 15,97 (18.95) 2.274
General skill unemployment 3,68 0.184
Average unemployment (public sector included, non-working excluded) 9.16 2.458
This virtual photography of the french economy on the year 2000 seems to be near the real one.
164 What about participation incentives?
In France, it appears that the participation rates are particulary low, comparatively to the other european
countries. This low participation, could be a restriction to an eﬃcient production process, and to the
wealth of social accounts.
4.1 The french policy to increase participation.
Then, a policy which increases the level of earned incomes on the low wages is led in France since 2002.
This principle, is called "Prime pour l’Emploi" and concerns particulary the unskilled workers.
The "Prime pour l’Emploi" is clearly build to incite the participation of the lowest skilled (and the
the lowest paid). One condition to be eligible is then that one in the household have an eﬀective job,
paid between 30% and 140% of the minimum wage. The tax credit level depends on the level of wage, it
increases from 30% to 100% of the minimum wage, then decreases.
The maximum tax credit, is then obtained with a minimum wage income. The surplus of earned
income for a full time employee paid on the minimum wage raises 6%, which is a real income increase.
4.1.1 Simulations and results. (First results and interpretations)
To have similar eﬀects than an tax credit, we will make decrease the level of the employee contributions
on the minimum wage. Then this contribution rate must modiﬁed from 21% to 16,26%. The incentive
eﬀects will be exactly the same in this case than with a tax credit, and the cost for the government is too
exactly the same.
Concerning the wage the speciﬁc-skilled workers, the same hypothesis is done, and the the contribution
rate, jumps from 20,6% to 19,6%.
A limited eﬀect on the participation. T h er e s u l t sa r es u m m a r i z e di nt h et a b l e
Variable Rate(%) Value Evolution
Unskilled employment 18,93 2,695 +6300
Speciﬁc-skill employment 49,55 7,056 +18320
Non activity 15,53 2,212 -28220
General-skill employment 96,32 4,816 +300
Unskilled unemployment (non-participant excluded) 18,88 2,278 +3600
General skill unemployment 3,68 0,184 -300
Average unemployment (public sector included, non-working excluded) 9.26 2,462 +3300
Few jobs created and essentially skilled jobs. It can be shown in this paper that the eﬀects
of this policy are very light. Only 24620 jobs have been created, in which 6300 unskilled jobs and 18320
speciﬁc skilled jobs. The fact that the speciﬁc skilled jobs beneﬁt particulary of the policy comes from
the ﬁnal production function. Indeed, the complementarity between unskilled and speciﬁc-skilled jobs is
given by the production function. In this case, the ex ante relative costs don’t change, because of the only
change of employee contribution rates. Then the repartition between the diﬀerent production factors
has not to be changed a priori. It’s not exactly the case, because of the changes in the bargained wage
of the speciﬁc skilled workers, what is explained in the following.
17A few evolution of the wages. Of course, the wages of the speciﬁc-skilled workers don’t change
ap r i o r i , but it’s not exactly the case. In fact, with the PPE, the earned income of a unskilled worker
increases and directly inﬂuences his intertemporal value function. Then it increases too the value function
of a unemployed worker, by the way of the expected income as an employed worker. Then the outside
option of an employee bargaining is greater, the the negotiated wage is bigger. Then the relative costs
between unskilled and speciﬁc-skilled workers will be changed ex post, and beneﬁts to the less skilled
ones. The global negotiated wage grows approximatively 3%,and then the relative cost grows the same
level.
What about the transition probabilities? With the PPE, the ﬁr m sh a v en o tt h ec h a n g ea
priori their vacancy opening policy. The costs are exactly the same with or without the PPE, then
their expected value by ﬁlled or vacant job are too the same. But the incentive changes the number of
candidates to ﬁll the job, then the probability to ﬁll a vacant job increases.
By the arrival of new workers, the probability to ﬁnd a job decreases, and we could observe some
unemployment traps, as we can have some low wages traps with the tax credits concerning employer
contributions.




The eﬀects of the PPE are very light, and don’t seem to reach his oﬃcial and declared objective.
The job creations are ﬁnally very few, and beneﬁts essentially to skilled workers, who have bargained
their wages, clearly upper the minimum wage. Furthermore, by the few job creations, the principle is
very costly, because many people are concerned and obtain this incentive, but the eﬀects on employment
and production are too small to compensate for this. The optimal mechanism to apply seems to be
an increase in the minimum wage (which is then not paid by the government) but compensated by tax
credits concerning employer contributions, in order to not increase (or to decrease) the labor costs.
We knows the real eﬃciency of the tax credits on employer contributions (cf [Campens et al., 2002]
or [Campens, 2003]) and it could be the most eﬃcient way with the minimum wage to increase the
partipation on the labor market. Furthermore, these wage growth will be included in the retirement
pension calculus, unemployment beneﬁts, etc. ; it’s not the case of the PPE, which is a direct income,
not included in the wage!
To be concluded...
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